INTRODUCTION
he Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ("CFE Treaty") is a seminal arms control agreement between the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") and the former Warsaw Pact.
1 Signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, and having entered into force on November 9, 1992, the Treaty established the reduction of troop and armament levels throughout Europe based on a system of parity.
2 Frequently described as "the cornerstone of European security," the CFE Treaty facilitated the demobilization of "more than 60,000 battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters." 3 On July 14, 2007, President Vladimir Putin announced that the Russian Federation was unilaterally "suspending" its [Vol. 33:3 participation in the CFE Treaty. 4 Russia's suspension officially went into effect on December 12, 2007.
5
Russia's decision to suspend its implementation of the CFE Treaty came in the midst of a period of rising tensions in its relations with the West. Ahead of the G8 summit in June 2007, President Putin threatened to aim Russia's missiles at Europe if the United States proceeded with plans to install a missile defense shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. 6 In late July 2007, the United Kingdom expelled four Russian diplomats for Moscow's failure to cooperate in the investigation of the murder of former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko; three days later, the Russian Foreign Ministry responded in kind, expelling four British diplomats. 7 In August 2007, Russian Air Force bombers resumed long-range sorties over the world's oceans, a Cold War-era practice that had been discontinued in the early 1990s. 8 Russia's announcement of its "suspension" of CFE Treaty participation is reminiscent of the United States' notification of its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ("ABM Treaty") in December 2001. 9 The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty inspired much international legal scholarship. 10 Referring to the highly political-rather than legal- justification for withdrawal provided by President Bush, one commentator mused that "it is possible that the stated grounds of the U.S. withdrawal [from the ABM Treaty] could be regarded as supplying a precedent for withdrawal by the United States or other countries from other arms control treaties containing similar withdrawal clauses." 11 However, scant attention has been given to the legal implications of Russia's "suspension."
12 This is especially surprising given the fact that the CFE Treaty does not contain a "suspension" clause but only a "withdrawal" clause. 13 Russia's unilateral "suspension" of its obligations under the CFE Treaty, and the validity of Russia's justifications are legal issues that may be analyzed under the law of treaties.
Part I of this Note provides background on the adaptation of the CFE Treaty, a description of Russia's "suspension" and a summary of the reactions of NATO members and other parties to the Treaty. Part II analyzes the differences between "withdrawal" and "suspension" in the law of treaties, and Part III closely examines the "Extraordinary Events" clause that appears in the CFE Treaty. Three customary international law grounds for treaty suspension are discussed in Part IV. Finally, Part V considers the legality of Russia's unilateral "suspension" of its obligationns under the CFE Treaty, determining that the act constitutes a material breach under customary international law.
I. THE ADAPTED CFE TREATY, RUSSIA'S "SUSPENSION" AND REACTIONS
Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the enlargement of NATO, 14 the States Parties to the CFE Treaty met in Istanbul and, on November 19, 1999, signed the Agreement on the Adaptation of the CFE Treaty ("CFE Adaptation Agreement"), replacing the anachronistic blocbased limits of the CFE Treaty with national and territorial ceilings, 6. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's failure to participate in the CFE Treaty has adverse effects on Russia's ability to implement its political commitments to military containment in the northwestern part of the Russian Federation. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania's actions result in a territory in which there are no restrictions on the deployment of conventional forces, including other countries' forces. 29 The statement indicated that the suspension is "in conformity with international law" and that "in case of necessity, immediate action to suspend the CFE Treaty can be taken by the President of the Russian Federation." 30 The Russian MFA released a statement elaborating on President Putin's decree. 31 The MFA confirmed that it conveyed formal notification of Russia's suspension to the "depositaries [sic] and other states parties to the CFE Treaty" on July 14, 2007. 32 The statement also intimated the practical effects of the suspension on the Russian Federation's obligations under the CFE Treaty: [I]n particular, providing information and receiving and conducting inspections will be temporarily suspended. Russia during the suspension will not be bound by any limits on conventional arms. But the real quantities of Russian military equipment will depend on the evolution of the military-political situation, particularly on the readiness of the other states parties to the CFE Treaty to show adequate restraint. . . . The Russian moratorium does not mean that we are shutting the door to further dialogue. In case of the solution of the questions raised by us it will be possible to quickly ensure the collective fulfillment of the Treaty's provisions. 33 Notwithstanding the ostensibly equivocal language in Putin's decree that Russia was "considering" a suspension, NATO responded as follows in a statement on July 16, 2007:
The announcement by the Russian Federation issued on the 14th of July 2007 to suspend as of the 12th of December 2007 its participation in the work of this landmark Treaty, including its flank regime and associated documents is deeply disappointing. The Allies are very concerned by this unilateral decision. 34 NATO Spokesman James Appathurai described Russia's move as "a step in the wrong direction." 35 The U.S. Department of State echoed these sentiments. 36 Even Ukraine, which has ratified the CFE Adaptation 33. July MFA Statement, supra note 31. Two months after the suspension announcement, a Russian general informed the State Duma (the lower chamber of Russia's Parliament) that "Russia will not scale up armaments for the duration of a moratorium" on the CFE Treaty. Agreement, expressed alarm at Russia's suspension. 37 Although some have questioned the legal basis for Russia's "suspension,"
38 thus far no State Party to the CFE Treaty has challenged the legality of Russia's move.
39
II. WITHDRAWAL VS. SUSPENSION Russia's pronouncements have consistently warned of a "suspension" or a "moratorium," but never of a "withdrawal." However, the CFE Treaty provides only for the latter. 40 These terms, and the mechanisms they represent, are not interchangeable. 41 The Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties
42 ("VCLT"), which "codified . . . the customary rules on the law of treaties," 43 provides for "[t]ermination of or withdrawal from a treaty" in article 54, a separate provision from the suspension provision found in article 57. 44 VCLT article 70(2) provides that a withdrawal "releases the [withdrawing party] from any obligation further to perform the treaty," while article 72(1)(a) provides that a suspension "releases the [suspending party] from the obligation to perform the treaty . . . during the period of the suspension." 45 Presumably, "the treaty cannot bind the withdrawing state again unless it goes through a new procedure to express its consent to be bound," whereas in a suspension "the treaty's operation can be resumed and the parties continue to have a treaty relationship during the suspension period."
46
Because withdrawal is a more drastic and permanent method of exiting a treaty than is suspension, one construction regards suspension as a "lesser, included power within the power to . . . withdraw from a treaty." 47 It would seem that "if the law of treaties seeks to preserve the stability of international commitments, it makes sense to always allow suspension in lieu of withdrawal or termination since the former will cause less injury to a treaty's stability."
48 VCLT article 62(3) appears to support this view by providing that "[i]f . . . a party may invoke a fundamental change of circumstances as a ground for terminating or withdrawing from a treaty it may also invoke the change as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty." 49 provision that seems to treat suspension as a derivative right of the right of withdrawal. This is likely because article 62 represents an "extremely narrow and restrictive" codification of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, now called "fundamental change of circumstances," which has proved daunting for any state to invoke successfully. 50 Thus, the VCLT's general approach is to regard suspension as a distinct right under the law of treaties.
51
International lawyers who negotiate treaties "use denunciation and withdrawal clauses to promote ratification and reduce uncertainty about the future."
52 Withdrawal clauses are attractive to states considering ratification of a treaty because they allay a state's fear that it will be indefinitely bound by a treaty at the expense of its national interests. 53 An empirical survey of treaty exit provisions identified six common variations of denunciation and withdrawal clauses, but did not indicate that any exit clauses provided for suspension in lieu of or in addition to withdrawal. 54 These findings suggest that treaty drafters over the years have not viewed a right to suspension as having the same risk-management appeal as does the right to unilateral withdrawal; otherwise, "suspension" clauses would be included in a substantial number of treaties. Moreover, nearly all Cold War arms control treaties have included the "Extraordinary Events" clause that provides for withdrawal, 55 but not for suspension. Especially where the suspending party does not place temporal limits on the suspension period, or establish firm conditions under which it will resume compliance with the treaty, suspension may damage a treaty's stability at least as much as, if not more than, withdrawal. When a state party formally withdraws from a treaty, other states parties can continue to implement the treaty with the knowledge that they no longer owe legal obligations under the treaty to the withdrawing state. 56 However, when a state unilaterally suspends a treaty, it is unclear to other state parties whether the suspending party will ultimately resume implementation of the treaty or maintain its suspension indefinitely. 57 Whereas the VCLT includes a separate article setting forth conditions under which a party can withdraw from a treaty that contains no provision for termination or withdrawal, 58 the VCLT does not provide for unilateral suspension unless it conforms with the treaty's provisions or is consented to by all the parties. 59 Thus, the VCLT implicitly acknowledges that unilateral suspension is potentially more volatile than unilateral withdrawal.
III. THE "EXTRAORDINARY EVENTS" CLAUSE
Analytically distinct from the parsing of withdrawal and suspension rights under customary international law is the issue of justification: on what grounds may a state party withdraw from a treaty? Whereas most withdrawal clauses analyzed in three editions of a United Nations ("U.N.") handbook "do not require a state to provide any justification for its decision to quit a treaty," arms control treaties generally require a state to provide to the other states parties advance notice that includes an explanation of its reasons for withdrawal. 60 Even if a treaty does not contain a withdrawal clause, VCLT article 65 provides that "notification shall indicate the measure proposed to be taken [i.e., withdrawal or suspension] and the reasons therefore." 57. Cf. Craig Dunkerley, Address at the Carnegie Moscow Center, The Politics of CFE-One American Perspective, (Nov. 16, 2007) , at 18, available at http://www.carngie.ru/en/pubs/media/1074411%2016%2007%20Dunkerley%20CFE%20 Speaking%20Notes.pdf ("I am not predicting that any particular set of hard and fast events would inevitably follow from a mid-December Russian suspension of their CFE compliance but precisely the contrary: greater uncertainty."). The VCLT seeks to mitigate the uncertainty surrounding the suspending party's ultimate intentions by providing that "the parties shall refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty" during the suspension period. See VCLT, supra note 42, art. 72(2).
58. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 56 (providing for denunciation or withdrawal if "it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal" or if "a right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty" so long as a party "give[s] not less than twelve months' notice of its intention to denounce or withdraw").
59. Since 1963, "all bilateral arms agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union [footnote omitted] and almost all multilateral arms treaties" have included the "Extraordinary Events" clause. 62 The Clause 63 refers to the withdrawing state's "national sovereignty" and "supreme interests," but narrowly circumscribes the clause's scope in that a state can only withdraw in response to "extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty." 64 No tribunal has formally defined or interpreted this clause under international law. 65 In fact, it has been fully exercised by a withdrawing state party on only two prior occasions: by North Korea when it announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty ("NPT") in 2003 66 and by the United States when it gave notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in 2001. 67 The clause first appeared in article IV of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater
68
(also known as the "Partial Test Ban Treaty," or "PTBT"). In negotiating the PTBT, the United States and the USSR contemplated three primary grounds justifying withdrawal under the "Extraordinary Events" clause:
(1) breach of the treaty by a State Party, (2) nuclear tests by a state not party to the treaty that might jeopardize the national security of the withdrawing party, and (3) nuclear explosions conducted by an unknown actor that would have violated the treaty or jeopardized the withdrawing party's national security were the actor to be identified as either a State Party or a state not party to the treaty. 69 Although the clause's wording 887-88 (1980) . To the extent that analyses of the withdrawal clause in the NPT include a discussion of the negotiating history of the original "Extraordinary Events" clause in the PTBT, such background information is helpful in interpreting the scope of the same clause in the CFE Treaty. Cf. id. at 885 ("Since [the withdrawal] right has been previously affirmed in the Partial Test-Ban Treaty, it would be seemed to leave "judgements on the existence of the extraordinary events completely to the discretion of the withdrawing state," 70 in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1963, then U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed his view that "a country could not withdraw for simply frivolous or unrelated matters as a matter of whim and still pretend that it is legal within the treaty to do so."
71 Although Rusk's statement suggests that certain reasons for withdrawal are not covered under the "Extraordinary Events" clause, neither the PTBT nor the CFE Treaty includes a provision for resolving a dispute between States Parties about the validity of a withdrawal under the clause. 72 The paragraph that follows the withdrawal clause in the CFE Treaty spells out one circumstance where the right to withdraw is guaranteed: if a State Party attempts to circumvent the treaty by amassing conventional weapons holdings beyond the treaty's scope, thereby threatening the balance of forces. 73 72. A provision of the CFE Treaty does require the Depository to "convene a conference of the States Parties which shall open no later than 21 days after receipt of the notice of withdrawal in order to consider questions relating to the withdrawal from this Treaty." CFE Treaty, supra note 1, art. XXI(4). However, such a conference cannot be regarded as an adjudicative mechanism; it is simply an opportunity for multilateral negotiations. Somewhat in contrast is the withdrawal clause in the NPT Treaty, which, while otherwise identical to that in the CFE Treaty (except for a three months' notice period instead of 150 days), requires that the withdrawing party also provide notice to the United Nations ("U. this provision was included to deter the Soviet Union from stockpiling armaments and equipment just east of the Ural Mountains, which would be outside the CFE Treaty's area of application, and from building up conventional armaments not limited by the treaty, such as armored combat vehicles controlled by paramilitary groups. 74 This provision demonstrates that the phrase "subject matter of this Treaty" in article XIX (2) 75 is a relatively flexible concept that provides the right to withdraw even in the absence of a party's breach of its explicit treaty obligations.
The question of the scope of the CFE Treaty's withdrawal clause was broached several times during U.S. Senate ratification hearings in 1991. In response to a question by Senator Biden about whether the United States would withdraw in the event that the USSR breached a "political pledge" to neutralize equipment east of the Urals, then Secretary of State James Baker III replied that "we have withdrawal rights that are perhaps a bit broader than just for reasons of circumvention of the treaty" and affirmed that " [w] 78 These flexible interpretations of the "Extraordinary Events" clause should be contextualized in a ratification process wherein the State Department endeavors to assuage Senators' concerns about U.S. obligations under the Treaty. Nevertheless, they reflect one State Party's understanding that withdrawal under article XIX(2) could be a legally sound response in various circumstances surrounding the CFE Treaty.
Thirty years after the original "Extraordinary Events" clause was born, a state invoked it for the first time. On March 12, 1993, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ("DPRK") notified the U.N. Security Council of its intent to withdraw from the NPT 79 under article X(1), effective three months later. 80 This notice included two reasons for the DPRK's decision: (1) a 1993 joint military exercise between South Korea and the United States that the DPRK claimed threatened its security, and (2) the International Atomic Energy Association ("IAEA") inspectors' alleged lack of objectivity in carrying out a specially authorized inspection of sites in the vicinity of DPRK nuclear energy facilities.
81
In the following months, the NPT's depositaries-the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation-as well as the U.N. Security Council, prevailed upon the DPRK to reverse its planned withdrawal. 82 A joint statement by the depositaries "question[ed] whether the DPRK's stated reasons for withdrawing constitute[d] extraordinary arising out of the implementation of this Treaty." CFE Treaty, supra note 1, arts. XVI(2)(A), XVI (2)(I), (7).
78. Baker Testimony, supra note 76 ("The Treaty contains mechanisms for withdrawal should this be necessary."). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in collaboration with the Bush Sr. administration, developed a protocol for reacting to nonaccession by militarily significant former Soviet republics; it gave the President the power to recommend withdrawal from the Treaty to the Senate following an unsuccessful "extraordinary conference" convenyed under article XXI. See CONG. REC. S18001, S18025 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Sen. Biden), available at http://www.dod.mil/acq/acic/treaties/cfe/congress/rattest15.htm.
79. NPT Treaty, supra note 72, art. X(1). 80. Perez, supra note 61, at 750. The NPT's requirement that a party withdrawing under the "Extraordinary Events" clause give notice of its intention to withdraw to the U.N. Security Council creates potential for third-party review of a withdrawal's validity. events relating to the subject-matter of the Treaty." 83 On June 11, 1993 just one day before its withdrawal was to become effective, the DPRK announced that it was "suspending" its withdrawal and "accept[ed] safeguards on all its nuclear material." 84 For nearly the next ten years, the DPRK remained a party to the NPT, until January 10, 2003, when it declared "an automatic and immediate effectuation of its withdrawal from the NPT, on which 'it unilaterally announced a moratorium as long as it deemed necessary' according to the June 11, 1993, DPRK-U.S. joint statement." 85 The DPRK's position was that it was reinstating its 1993 notice of withdrawal, under which remained all but one day before it was to become legally binding. 86 The States Parties to the NPT rejected this argument, regarding the DPRK's declaration as a new notice of a withdrawal that would not become effective until April 10, 2003. 87 Neither the NPT nor the VCLT makes provision for the "suspension" of a notice of withdrawal. 88 The VCLT provides only that "[a] notification or instrument [of withdrawal] may be revoked at any time before it takes effect." 89 The NPT parties' apparent interpretation of the DPRK's 1993 "moratorium" on its withdrawal as a full "revocation" under VCLT article 68 suggests that customary international law does not permit states to implement "suspension" where the VCLT provides only for a more stable measure like "revocation." 88. See Perez, supra note 61, at 751 n.9. 89. VCLT, supra note 42, art. 68 (emphasis added). 90. The official commentary to the International Law Commission's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, upon which the VCLT is based, affirmed the importance of a right of revocation during the notice period without mentioning the "suspension" of a Moreover, although the DPRK claimed to act "under the grave situation where [its] supreme interests are most seriously threatened," 91 its grounds for withdrawal in 2003 were no more valid under the "Extraordinary Events" clause than they were in 1993. 92 However, the U.N. Security Council did not invalidate the DPRK's reasons for withdrawal and order the DPRK to remain within the NPT because China would have vetoed such a resolution. 93 Perhaps the United States did not challenge the legality of the DPRK's 2003 withdrawal from the NPT because the United States had, about one year earlier, itself unilaterally withdrawn from a landmark arms control treaty. 94 On December 13, 2001, the United States conveyed notice of its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty to Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 95 The U.S. statement expressly invoked article XV(2) of the ABM Treaty, which is substantively identical to the CFE Treaty's withdrawal clause. 96 After noting that the "strategic relationship with Russia . . . is cooperative rather than adversarial," unlike when the Treaty was concluded in 1972, the United States described the development of long- range ballistic missiles by certain states and the active attempt to acquire "weapons of mass destruction" by "a number of state and non-state entities" as "pos[ing] a direct threat to the territory and security of the United States and jeopardiz[ing] its supreme interests."
97 President Putin, in a televised response, declared that the U.S. decision was "mistaken" but that it did "not pose a threat to the national security of the Russian Federation." 98 However, many other world leaders and U.S. senators expressed concern that the U.S. repudiation of the ABM Treaty could spur a new arms race in anti-ballistic missiles.
99
Most legal analyses leading up to and in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal concluded that growing threats from "rogue states" and terrorists, especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, constituted "extraordinary events" justifying unilateral withdrawal from the Treaty. 100 At the same time, commentators warned that negotiation and compromise with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty would have been a sounder policy for the U.S, given third-party states' dependence on the security environment established by the Treaty. 101 More controversial was whether the U.S. withdrawal comported with the "fundamental change of circumstances" doctrine in VCLT article 62, which the White House seemed implicitly to invoke in its withdrawal statement.
102 Some suggested that cumstances existing when the treaty was concluded, (2) the change must be "fundamental," (3) the parties must not have foreseen the change, (4) the existence of those circumstances must have been an essential basis for the parties' original consent to be bound by the treaty, and (5) the change must radically transform the "extent" of treaty obligations still to be performed.
110
Article 62 of the VCLT does not define the terms "fundamental" or "extent of obligations still to be performed," 111 nor, for that matter, delineate the scope of the term "circumstances." Paragraph 2 expressly disqualifies invocation of the doctrine in two cases: if the treaty in question establishes a boundary, or if the invoking party's own breach of any international obligation owed to a party to the treaty is the cause of the claimed "fundamental change." 112 Finally, as discussed supra above in Part II, paragraph 3 of article 62 provides that a party invoking article 62 to suspend a treaty's operation must satisfy the same conditions required for termination or withdrawal-the five-part test of paragraph 1. 113 Traditionally, the outbreak of war between parties to a treaty or the creation of new states have both been accepted as grounds for application of the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, whereas internal political revolutions, policy shifts, or the partial loss of treaty goals have been rejected. 114 In the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case before the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), Hungary claimed that its 1992 termination of a 1977 treaty with then Czechoslovakia was justified under VCLT article 62 because the policy of "socialist integration" had disappeared, market economies had emerged in both states, a "unilateral scheme" had replaced a "single and indivisible operational system," and the treaty had become "a prescription for environmental disaster." 115 The 1997 judgment of the ICJ determined that the collective effect of these changed circumstances would not "radically transform the extent of the obligations still to be performed." 116 The court thus confirmed the exacting customary law standard required for invocation of article 62. 117 Moreover, since the "Ex- traordinary Events" clause is available to states parties to arms control treaties, the "fundamental change of circumstances" doctrine "at best . . . would operate as a secondary argument which has no immediate legal effect." 118 VCLT article 60 permits a party to suspend unilaterally a multilateral treaty as a response to a specific event: material breach of that treaty by one of the parties. 119 If a party is "specially affected by the breach," then it can "suspend[] the operation of the treaty in whole or in part in the relations between itself and the defaulting State."
120 Alternately, in a treaty "of such a character that a material breach of its provisions by one party radically changes the position of every party," any party (besides the defaulting state) can suspend the treaty in whole or in part. 121 This latter provision was designed for disarmament or arms control treaties.
122 Paragraph 3 defines "material" breaches as either "a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention" or "the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty." 123 The ICJ also had occasion to interpret article 60 in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, insofar as Hungary claimed that Czechoslovakia materially breached a treaty in 1991 by launching a project known as "Variant C" to divert the Danube River. 124 The court, in rejecting Hungary's contention, stressed the importance of procedural rules, and applied article 60 "in a very rigorous manner." 125 Moreover, "if [a] breach is not material . . . any purported denunciation on the grounds of breach will be illegal and invalid . . . becom[ing] a breach in itself giving the other party a right to take countermeasures."
126
VCLT article 61 provides that an "impossibility of performing a treaty" may be invoked "as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty" where the "impossibility results from the . . . [temporary] disappearance or destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty." 127 Paragraph 2 precludes the invocation of impossibility "if the impossibility is the result of a breach by that party either of an obligation under the treaty or of any other international obligation owed to any other party to the treaty."
128 In Gabčikovo-Nagymaros, the ICJ suggested a narrow interpretation of impossibility of performance based on the discussions at the 1968 Diplomatic Conference that adopted the VCLT. 129 While the court found it unnecessary "to determine whether the term 'object' in Article 61 can also be understood to embrace a legal régime"-as Hungary had argued it should-the court dutifully applied paragraph 2, finding that Hungary's own breaches of the treaty brought about any "impossibility." Russia's unilateral "suspension" of the CFE Treaty has drawn a swarm of political and media attention, 131 but not much reaction from scholars of international law. 132 There may be a presumption that Russia's move, following the treaty withdrawals of the DPRK and the United States earlier this decade, is legally unassailable because of the "Extraordinary Events" clause. 133 This view is misguided. Russia's suspension has uncovered a novel question in the law of treaties, an exploration of which may not only facilitate resolution of the ongoing impasse over the CFE Treaty, but also help enhance the stability of arms control agreements in general.
Russia's suspension of the CFE Treaty's operation, in effect as of December 12, 2007, 134 amounts to breach of the treaty, embodying both forms of material breach delineated in VCLT article 60(3). First, the suspension is a material breach as "a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by [the VCLT]." 135 The VCLT allows for suspension that is either "in conformity with the provisions of the treaty" or has the "consent of all the parties after consultation with the other contracting States." 136 Clearly, the parties to the CFE Treaty did not consent to the suspension: a NATO statement dated December 12, 2007 declared that "NATO Allies deeply regret" Russia's decision. 137 Russia's intended suspension was not a topic at the "Extraordinary Conference" in June 2007, 138 so there was effectively no formal "consultation with the other contracting states."
Nor does Russia's "suspension" conform to the provisions of the CFE Treaty. The Treaty, which is of "unlimited duration," provides in article XIX(2) that "[e]ach State Party shall . . . have the right to withdraw from this Treaty . . . ."
139 Russian authorities have expressly distinguished Russia's "suspension" from a withdrawal, 140 so there is no translation discrepancy. VCLT article 31(1) prescribes the general rule that "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose." 141 The ordinary meaning of the term "withdraw" may be ascertained from VCLT article 70, which provides that withdrawal "releases the [withdrawing party] from any obligation further to perform the treaty."
142 Thus, under an ordinary meaning interpretation of article XIX(2), Russia's suspension is a clear violation.
143
Yet Russia's Foreign Minister has publicly placed Russia on the following legal footing:
From the legal point of view, the withdrawal provision in the CFE Treaty gives reason to assert that a member state has the right to suspend the Treaty on the same grounds on which it can withdraw from it. This conclusion arises from the general principle of law and the usual norm of international law, expressed by the formula 'he who has greater leeway is also entitled to the smaller leeway contained in it.' In the light of this legal principle repeatedly applied in international legal practice, withdrawal from the treaty is 'greater leeway,' and suspension 'the smaller leeway' therein contained. 144 Here, then, lies the legal foundation of Russia's "suspension": a purported "general principle of law" used as a maxim of interpretation. The principle cited by Minister Lavrov, using his language, is not encountered in any authorities. 145 The closest Latin phrase is major continet in se minus ("the greater includes within itself the less."). 146 However, neither this maxim, nor any application of it, is encountered in any international law materials. Even the English lay phrase "lesser, included power," 147 which adequately captures the concept upon which Russia relies, is not found in any relevant authorities. Russia's suggestion that the principle is frequently used in international law is thus unsupported.
In distinction is a competing Latin phrase: expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("to express or include one thing implies the exclusion of . . . the 142. Id. art. 70(1)(a), 70(2). 143. The VCLT provides that "[a] special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended." Id. art. 31(4). This cannot be established for reasons discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 148- 147. See Hollis, supra note 12 ("[I]n order for Russia to sustain its reliance on the CFE Treaty, the law of treaties would need either to regard suspension and withdrawal as interchangeable, or view the suspension power as a lesser, included power within the power to terminate or withdraw from a treaty.").
of the VCLT. Therefore, Russia has worked a material breach of the CFE Treaty.
Russia may contend that its domestic law did not allow it to "withdraw" from the CFE Treaty, but only to "suspend" the Treaty's operation. 159 Article 37(4) of the 1995 Federal Law of the Russian Federation on International Treaties of the Russian Federation provides:
The operation of an international treaty of the Russian Federation, the decision concerning consent to the bindingness of which for the Russian Federation was adopted in the form of a Federal Law, may be suspended by the President of the Russian Federation in instances requiring the taking of urgent measures. 160 
